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Abstract
The Internet is in many ways both fascinating and yet also scary. For
most people, a single commercial entity owns the power to disclose all
their personal emails. Most commonly your emails are only disclosed to
you and your correspondent, but the power to choose who sees these
emails is in fact not yours. The power to control the release of data
about ones person is what most people refer to as privacy.
In spite of this, almost nothing that the Internet is used for gives the
originator of a message control over it. When you use a social me-
dia platform, you are given the intuition that you choose which friends
who can see any posts and photos that you publish, and of course the
connection is encrypted to thwart eavesdropping. However, the service
provider may still share this data to anyone they like. From a techno-
logical standpoint, a user almost never has the power of their data; in
other words, there’s normally no privacy on the Internet.
This thesis is describes dierent ways of giving end-users more con-
trol over some parts of their own personal data using cryptography for
the specic case of location data, enhancing their privacy. The ma-
jority of the thesis explores how to make use of location proximity, to
check whether to users are close to each other, as a basic primitive while
maintaining privacy through additively homomorphic encryption. The
thesis further explores the application scenario of ridesharing, or car
pooling, using both additively homomorphic encryption and private
set intersection. All of the solutions presented sport proven privacy-
preserving capabilities, and have been implemented to measure their
performance. This thesis shows in what contexts there’s still a ways to
go, but also highlights some settings in which it might already be time
to move theory into practice.

Acknowledgements
My greatest thanks goes to my two supervisors and good friends, An-
drei and Martìn. I am positive that I would not have chosen research as
my path in life if not for the two of you.
To Andrei, for continuously turning my attention back towards re-
search. I started working part-time with Andrei a few years back, and I
(we? ,) always had a good time. Andrei’s helped me to not only cope
with, but enjoy, research on the side of an often busy life situation. An-
drei is without doubt the biggest reason why I decided to come back to
Chalmers. Not because other employers aren’t good, but because hav-
ing Andrei as your supervisor is downright awesome.
To Martìn. Right from the start it was very fun working with you,
and I’m repeatedly amazed that I can learn so much from your approach
to the problems we solve. You are a phenomenal support during work
hours, and a rare good friend after. I can’t help but feel lucky to have
stumbled into collaboration with you.
Thanks goes also to the entire department at Chalmers, entirely too
many to list here.
Further thanks goes to my academic foster family at the TUM; to
Alexander, Dominik, Enrico, Florian, Kobold Superstar, Martìn (again),
Matthias, Prachi, Sebastian and Tobias. Thanks for the no-limits-or-
boundaries discussions and for the great Thursdays!
My parents deserve so many more thanks than I can give, for always
supporting and encouraging me, and not even knowing that they’re do-
ing it. And thanks to Henrik for thorough proofreading!
Finally, to my dearest Kristin, the number one fan of my academic
career. You are an endless source of support and encouragement, there’s
nobody who believes more in me than you do. For all the laughs, all the
love and all the popcorn you give to me, I cannot thank you enough.

Contents
Introduction 1
Paper One
InnerCircle: A Decentralized Privacy-
Preserving Location Proximity Protocol
19
Paper Two
BetterTimes: Privacy-assured Out-
sourced Multiplications for Additively
Homomorphic Encryption on Finite
Fields
53
Paper Three
MaxPace: Speed-Constrained Location
Q_ueries
77
Paper Four
Location-enhanced Authentication us-
ing the IoT: Because You Cannot Be in
Two Places at Once
113
Paper Five
Privacy-Preserving Location-Proximity
for Mobile Apps
149
Paper Six
PrivatePool: Privacy-Preserving
Ridesharing
171

Introduction
The Internet is vast, and in many ways it is an amazing piece of technology. It con-
nects people from all over the world. It lets us do banking, watch movies, listen to
music, read newspapers, receive education from home, search for information, and
enjoy social interaction with all of our friends. The Internet plays a very important
role in our society today. Most of what we are, what denes us as individuals, has at
some point passed over the Internet. How many steps we walked today, our weight,
travel schedule, our grades and achievements, our emails, our taste in music, our re-
lationships, all of our digital conversations, our attitude towards friends, our mood
day-by-day, and the entirety of our economic data. All the data needed to tell who
and what we are is on the Internet.
Our information has never before been so exposed. We rely on the Internet in
every-day life, many tasks carried out today would not be possible without it. And
while we need to transmit sensitive data over the Internet, we also need to to main-
tain our personal integrity – we can not let the internet degrade us below what is
decent with respect to our privacy. Already in 1890 Warren and Brandeis thought
that technology was spreading information too fast for privacy to be maintained. In
their work “The right to privacy” they respond to the technological advancement of
the camera and the increasing proliferation of newspapers making use of photogra-
phy. In this work, they also gave us the rst denition of privacy, as “right to be let
alone” [24].
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred
precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to
make good the prediction that “what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed
from the house-tops.”
– Warren and Brandeis
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Though devices are no longer mechanical but instead digital, we still struggle
with privacy in much the same way. Today we have much more data than images
that we need to protect, and information spreads in a completely incomparable ve-
locity as compared to 1890. What is the impact of cameras and newspapers next to
that of smartphones and social media? Given that we have the same concerns, but
the technology impact is tremendously much greater I can not help but to raise the
question of whether Warren and Brandeis exaggerated the impact then, or if we do
not fully appreciate the threat of the modern age.
I think we rely more heavily on personal integrity than we realize in our day-to-
day life. The United Nations lists privacy as article 12 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights by the United Nations [22]. In fact, it is easy to get the feeling that the
free world is not likely to continue to function in the event of serious degradation
of privacy. Our behavior is known to be more constrained if we know that we are
observed [25, 8], making us less likely to speak out of turn, to deviate from the norm,
to innovate, and to call out miss-behavior. I would even go so far as to say that
a democratic society, as far as we see them today, would be very hard-pressed to
exist in a world without privacy. If ballots are not private, can minorities really vote
according to their hearts’ desire?
I personally do not think there is any doubt that we need to work on maintaining
privacy – not only in the short term, but for a sustainable society in the long run –
but we also can not cease exposing our information to the Internet. It is therefore
important that we are able to use current services on the Internet privately. We
should be able to exchange messages without fear of having our privacy violated,
but at the same time we need to enjoy not only the services we see today, but also
the ever more complex applications of the future.
This thesis focuses on exploring the privacy of a specic piece of information –
our location. In this work, we use a technique called secure multi-party computation
(SMC) [26]. Using SMC, we give guarantees that when location information is sent
to services on the Internet, it remains impossible for the service provider to read the
data without the consent of the end user.
1 Privacy and Condentiality
Most of this thesis talks about privacy. Privacy is a subjective matter, and what is
considered private information is often dierent in dierent cultures. Computer sci-
entists often talk about condentiality instead, which has a more objective and pre-
cise meaning. Whether or not a system provides privacy for the user’s data is not
Introduction 3
something we can prove mathematically – but whether the data is condential is
an objective fact. As an example, tax statements in Sweden are public documents.
Being a swede, my privacy is therefore not violated by the fact that my income is not
condential, as this is inherently accepted in the Swedish society. We can construct
a system which keeps tax statements condential, but to construct a system which
respects the users’ privacy we may have to take into consideration whether they
were brought up in Sweden or some other country. In this thesis, as is common in
the literature within computer security, the words privacy and condentiality are
sometimes used interchangeably – when talking about the privacy of a users, we
mean the condentiality of their data.
In public media we sometimes see arguments raised against privacy, as it for in-
stance hampers the eectiveness of law enforcement. Law enforcement may need
to have surveillance on known criminals to maintain safe living conditions. How-
ever, for the scope of this thesis more privacy is always considered better than less
privacy.
A large portion of the techniques proposed in academic literature to preserve
privacy make use of pragmatic approaches such as simple transformations of the
data to hide the most important characteristics, commonly referred to as obfuscation.
In my opinion, these largely fall short to provide rigorous privacy guarantees. In
contrast, this thesis focuses on approaches using SMC in order to protect a user’s
information, ensuring that the service is unable to intrude on privacy, rather than
unlikely as may be the eect of obfuscation techniques.
Location Privacy Location privacy was dened as "the ability to prevent other par-
ties from learning one’s current or past location" by Beresford and Stajano in 2003 [2].
Later, a more precise denition was presented by Duckham and Kulik in 2006, who
called it "a special type of information privacy which concerns the claim of individuals
to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent location information about
them is communicated to others" [9]. This denition by Duckham and Kulik captures
subtle nuances of location information that can be disclosed: when, how and what. It
is reasonable that a user is more concerned about disclosure of their recent location
updates than older information. How information is released is also of importance,
for instance a service may allow the owner of location data to decline certain loca-
tion requests rather than always automatically dispatching information about their
location. Finally, what information is disclosed, and in what detail, is naturally of
interest – a user may be ne with disclosing which city they are currently in, but
not willing to disclose whether they are in the hospital.
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Some researchers have argued that many users are willing to give away their
location information [1, 6]. In my opinion this fact does not in any way lessen the
importance of location privacy, it simply shows that users are keen to use the ser-
vice. Since it has hitherto not been possible to easily deploy a privacy-preserving
Location-Based Service (LBS), I conjecture that such approaches will be increasingly
popular as they apply to more and more services.
I would argue that if privacy is inherently guaranteed by the technology, many
audiences would likely be willing to provide more of their private data. Thus, these
techniques open new venues for operating on private data, and enables more pri-
vate data to be collected. They would need to trust only the technology, instead of
the service provider. Using SMC, and thus allowing more private data to be used
while making sure that less data is known, could give very powerful platforms in
the future.
2 A Gentle Introduction to Secure Multi-party Computation
Existing cryptographic techniques have for a long time made information unread-
able except towards intended parties [23, 27]. SMC is a separate strain of research
which recently picked up much momentum and makes information usable while still
being unreadable [18, 17, 11]. Traditional cryptography handles static information.
It allows us to send and receive information privately by encrypting communication
when surng the web, reading emails and using instant messaging. It also allows us
to store data privately by encrypting our hard drives.
With traditional cryptography, the data that can be decrypted is exactly the data
that was encrypted. With SMC, we can encrypt some piece of data, and perform
computations on the ciphertext, to decrypt something else. As an example, let us
imagine three users Alice, Bob and Claire. Assume that Alice and Bob can encrypt
data, but only Claire can decrypt. Alice and Bob each has a secret number a and b,
respectively. Alice and Bob wants to let Claire now the sum of their numbers. To
achieve this, Alice encrypts her number, say a = 2, sends it to Bob, who can add his
number to the ciphertext, say b = 3. Now Claire can decrypt the number 5, while
Alice and Bob retains the privacy of their secret inputs.
The above example is not a very useful application compared to most services
we see on the internet, but as we will see later in the thesis, SMC can be used for real-
world applications as well. This means that maintaining privacy no longer implies
the necessity to remove functionality – Alice and Bob can keep a and b secret while
still allowing Claire to learn the sum. We can focus on achieving the functionality
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of an application, rather than on telling the service provider all information needed
in the necessary computation. Companies behind social networks wants to target
adds towards you, they do not necessarily need to know your private data. A good
example of how these cryptographic techniques can be applied is shown by Bogetoft
et al. [5], where they present results from an experiment for sugar beet farmers in
Denmark. The farmers sold their crops in a privacy-preserving manner with the help
a cryptographic auctioning system. The sales were processed without disclosing any
bids, except the nal one, to any party.
The three distinct areas that currently dominate the SMC scene are homomor-
phic encryption (HE) [18, 11], garbled circuits (GC) [26] and secret sharing (SS) [21].
Homomorphic encryption schemes commonly support only computation of either
multiplication or addition [17], and are then called partially homomorphic. How-
ever, fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes also exist [11], which can com-
pute both additions and multiplications given only ciphertexts. Unfortunately, FHE
is much less ecient than HE schemes which are only additively or multiplicatively
homomorphic.
Homomorphic encryption can compute arithmetic integer operations in con-
stant time with respect to the size of the operands. Garbled circuits is often faster
for more complex functions where variable size is small and xed. There is active
and accelerating research in both elds, and which solution performs best is typ-
ically application-dependent. Secret sharing normally requires an honest majority
(for instance three parties with at most one is misbehaving), but is for many applica-
tions the most ecient approach to SMC. Secret sharing has been shown to be suit-
able for several real-life scenarios as exemplied through usages of the ShareMind
Project [4, 13] where this level of trust is acceptable and eciency is paramount.
SMC can be integrated in a system in dierent ways depending on which of
FHE, HE, SS and GC is used. FHE is a great solution for cloud computing scenarios,
as the party holding the private key does not need to be active during computations.
For partially HE and GC, it is usually not the case that the party receiving the out-
put has to do less work than if the protocol is run in the plaintexts, though it has
been demonstrated that GC can be used to speed up computations for some appli-
cations [7]. For partially HE and GC, it is common that the function is computed by
a party that also is providing inputs. SS is mostly suitable when the involved stake-
holders in a system are xed, and where they inherently are reluctant to collude.
This could be the setting of a set of governmental institutions, for instance. When
applying SMC for location privacy HE is a good choice, as geometric computations
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are carried out using many arithmetic operations, which is why this is the choice
made for most works included this thesis.
Homomorphic Encryption Several papers in this thesis focuses on how to use
HE. HE schemes are a subset of public-key encryption schemes. Public-key cryp-
tographic systems are asymmetric, where only the holder of the private key can
decrypt and anyone who holds the public key can encrypt. The private key must re-
main secret, while the public key can be published and considered globally known.
Some other cryptographic systems are symmetric, which means that the same key is
used both for encryption and decryption, but these are not important for this thesis.
HE allow for a user who does not hold the private key (and thus cannot decrypt
the data) to compute functions on the ciphertexts, which have predictable meaning
in the plaintexts. The most canonical example is school-book RSA. Given a private
key k and a public key K , encryption works by exponentiation, a message m is
encrypted by computing mK , resulting in a ciphertext c. Given two ciphertexts c1
(encryptingm1) and c2 (encryptingm2), any party can compute the ciphertext c3 =
(m1 ∗m2)K by simply multiplying c1 and c2.
The second and third paper of this thesis uses additively homomorphic encryp-
tion. Given two ciphertexts encrypted using an additively homomorphic crypto-
graphic system, such that c1 is the encryption ofm1, and c2 is the encryption ofm2,
one can compute another ciphertext c3 encryptingm1+m2. Using additively homo-
morphic encryption, it is also possible to compute the multiplication if one plaintext
is known to the evaluator. To compute c1 · c2 while knowing that c2 encrypts m2,
one adds c1 to itself m2 times, computing
∑m2
0 c1.
3 Contributions
This section outlines the contributions presented later in the thesis. The thesis con-
tains six separate papers, which all follow Alice and Bob as they try to communicate
dierent functions of location data with dierent privacy guarantees.
The rst paper proposes a concise privacy-preserving protocol for proximity
testing, called InnerCircle. InnerCircle is a building block used in several of the fol-
lowing papers. InnerCircle only gives privacy guarantees if the attacker is honest,
in the sense that they follow the protocol. This attacker model, called semi-honest,
is a normal setting when the adversary cannot easily change the source code of the
running program. The second paper provides a new primitive, called BetterTimes,
which can be used in InnerCircle and many other protocols to allow them to tackle
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stronger attackers, called malicious, who are also able to deviate from the intended
protocol ow.
Another drawback of InnerCircle is that it only considers what privacy guaran-
tees are achieved during a single invocation of the protocol. But when included in
an application, the protocol is likely to run many times. This is addressed with the
MaxPace policy, which tackles malicious adversaries while giving privacy guaran-
tees even as the protocol is rerun.
The fourth paper utilizes the Internet of Things (IoT) to enable stronger authen-
tication. This is done by aggregating the location data of all devices believed to be
carried by the user. While such a system may be run by any trusted third party, we
also provide a privacy-preserving version utilizing similar techniques as those used
in InnerCircle.
The fth paper studies how InnerCircle as implemented to be used in an Android
app compares to existing popular Android applications found on Google Play.
The last paper of the thesis considers a larger functionality than proximity test-
ing, that of ridesharing. The paper studies what patterns users which may enjoy
ridesharing may follow, and shows two separate tracks to detect ridesharing oppor-
tunities, one via an extension of InnerCircle, and the other via novel primitive we
call threshold private set intersection.
3.1 Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Location Proximity
The rst paper of this thesis focuses on the problem of location proximity, where
principals are willing to reveal only whether they are within a certain distance from
each other. The principals are privacy-sensitive, not willing to reveal any further
information about their locations, nor the distance.
Privacy-sensitive location information of end users is commonly sent to the LBS
in plaintext, trusting a third party is to handle principals’ locations. However, due
to privacy concerns it is better to avoid trusting third parties. We therefore take the
road of making the data computationally unobtainable, encrypting it with a private
key known only to the user whom the data concerns.
Many simple approaches to location privacy are based on obfuscating a prin-
cipal’s position. Such techniques often decrease the usability of the service due to
the introduction of inaccurate results. These approaches lead to false positives and
false negatives. In some cases over 66% of reported positives can be false [16] A
major challenge to be addressed is to provide precise results without unnecessary
information disclosure.
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Homomorphic encryption is an apt tool to give control of location data to the
principal whose location is being measured. It allows for them to encrypt the data
before dispatching it to the LBS, while still enjoying the service normally. By using
SMC, a user may control what information is disclosed even after the information
has been sent away from devices controlled by the user.
InnerCircle is a privacy-preserving protocol for location proximity requiring
merely one round-trip. InnerCircle allows for only the general proximity of a prin-
cipal, with a radius r, to be disclosed while maintaining privacy of each principal’s
input. In contrast to most of the related work, we fully dispense with any third
parties while maintaining a precise result, yielding no false positives or negatives
at all. Further, InnerCircle benets highly from parallelization in contrast to much
previous work which gives better eciency than existing approaches for realistic
parameters.
Statement of Contribution This paper was co-authored with Martìn Ochoa and An-
drei Sabelfeld. All authors contributed equally to the technical development and
writing of the material.
This paper was published in the proceedings of the 13th IEEE conference on
Privacy, Security and Trust (PST 2015).
3.2 Privacy-assured Outsourced Multiplications
This paper is a more theoretical, high-level contribution, presenting a system to
compute any arithmetic formula in a privacy-preserving manner using an additively
homomorphic encryption scheme. An arithmetic formula can be seen a directed
graph where each node is an operation, each source is an input and where there is
a single sink. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
X2 + Y2
•
+
• X
2
Y2
X
X
Y
Y
Fig. 1. An arithmetic formula computing X2 + Y 2
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A good example of an arithmetic formula that is frequently seen in the litera-
ture is to compute the (squared) euclidean distance between two coordinates. The
technique is leveraged by a range of protocols within privacy-preserving biometric
authentication and privacy-preserving LBS [10, 20, 14, 19, 28]. This can be used to
compare feature vectors to nd users with similar interests, to compare eigenvec-
tors when comparing images, or for LBS.
The squared euclidean distance is shown in Equation 1 (where xA and yA are
inputs from principal A and xB and yB are inputs from principal B). Recalling that
Bob can add and multiply by scalar numbers, one can separate inputs from both
parties, such that e.g.A can send three ciphertexts α = 2xA, β = 2yA, γ = x2A+y2A
to B to let B calculate the distance homomorphically.
D = x2A + y
2
A + x
2
B + y
2
B − (2xAxB + 2yAyB) (1)
However, a problem arises if A decides to send three ciphertexts such that γ 6=(
α
2
)2
+
(
β
2
)2
. In this case, A can trick B into computing another function than the
euclidean distance between (xA, yA) and (xB , yB) which causes unwanted leakage
of information.
The novelty in the paper is a privacy-assured multiplication protocol, called Bet-
terTimes. Using BetterTimes, a system for arbitrary arithmetic formulas is proposed,
which allows us to let Alice send (xA, yA) directly, instead of the three ciphertexts
computed from her coordinates. This system can be applied to upgrade much ex-
isting work from being secure only against honest-but-curious adversaries to being
secure in the malicious adversary model. The approach approach is evaluated us-
ing a prototypical implementation. The results show that the added overhead of our
approach is small compared to insecure outsourced multiplication.
Statement of Contribution This paper was co-authored with Martìn Ochoa and An-
drei Sabelfeld. All authors contributed equally to the technical development and
writing of the material.
This paper was published in the proceedings of the 9th LNCS conference on
Provable Security (ProvSec 2015).
3.3 Speed-Constrained Location Queries
Combining the two previous papers, we can construct a protocol to test the prox-
imity of Alice and Bob while preserving privacy even in the case when Alice is mis-
behaving in any arbitrary manner (technically, she is a malicious adversary). How-
ever, when considering real-world applications of location proximity, we see that
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even with protections against malicious adversaries in a single run of the protocol,
we are still vulnerable to adversaries that re-run the protocol in order to learn Bob’s
location. This is usually referred to as a multi-run attacker or continuous querying.
To mitigate these concerns we develop MaxPace, a general policy framework to
restrict proximity queries based on the speed of the requester. We demonstrate the
boost of privacy by comparative bounds on how the knowledge about the users’
location changes over time. The eectiveness of the policy is illustrated in Figure 2,
where and unconstrained attacker locates Bob (who’s position is marked by a star)
in three attempts, while an attacker under the MaxPace policy needs nine attempts.
B1 2 3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 B
Fig. 2. Dierent protocols
MaxPace applies to both a centralized
setting, where the server can enforce the
policy on the actual locations, and a de-
centralized setting, dispensing with the
need to reveal user locations to the service
provider. The former has already found
a way into practical location-based ser-
vices. For the latter, we develop a proto-
col using techniques from both InnerCir-
cle and BetterTimes, which also incorpo-
rates the speed constraints in its design.
We formally establish the protocol’s pri-
vacy guarantees and benchmark our pro-
totype implementation to demonstrate the
protocol’s practical feasibility.
Statement of Contribution This paper was co-authored with Martìn Ochoa and An-
drei Sabelfeld. All authors contributed equally to the technical development and
writing of the material.
This paper was published in the proceedings of the IEEE conference on Com-
munications and Network Security (CNS 2016).
3.4 Location-enhanced Authentication using the IoT
User location can act as an additional factor of authentication in scenarios where
physical presence is required, such as when making in-person purchases or unlock-
ing a vehicle. This paper proposes a novel approach for estimating user location and
modeling user movement using the Internet of Things (IoT). The goal is to utilize
the scale and diversity of devices in the IoT to estimate the user’s location robustly.
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We leverage the increasing number of IoT devices carried and used by them and the
smart environments that observe these devices. We also exploit the ability of many
IoT devices to “sense” the user. Correct estimation of a user’s location can be used to
stop adversaries from using compromised user credentials (e.g., stolen keys, credit
cards, passwords, etc.) in arbitrary physical locations. An example is given in Fig-
ure 3, where a user’s devices are observed in their home at 8:00 AM, in a coee shop
at 8:15 AM, and where the user tries to enter their oce building at 8:35 AM. The
user has left their tablet device at home, but since there are more devices with the
user near the oce than at home, the system will detect the user’s true position in
the oce. If instead, for instance, the credit card would be in the coee shop, and all
the user’s devices in the oce, a purchase should not be allowed.
8:00AM 8:15AM
8:35AM Can the user be in front of 
the o ce building?
Fig. 3. An example of location-enhanced authentication
To demonstrate how eective and how ecient the approach is, a concrete sys-
tem was developed, called Icelus. Experiments with Icelus shows that it exhibits a
smaller false-rejection rate than for instance smartphone-based location-based au-
thentication and it rejects attackers with few errors (i.e., false acceptances). Icelus
collects location and activity data from IoT devices to model user movement and lo-
cation. Icelus can run as a service on a device of the user, such as a smarthome hub,
or it can be hosted in the cloud. To collect data, it organizes the various devices in a
hierarchy, so that the ones with Internet connectivity can relay the data of the ones
without to the system. Third-party systems can also provide data by directly con-
necting to Icelus or indirectly by forwarding notications of certain events (e.g. the
use of a credit card at a location, an entry in the user’s calendar, etc.). To alleviate
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privacy concerns, we also develop a privacy-preserving extension of the protocol
used in Icelus that allows us to operate purely on distances, without revealing the
actual locations of individual devices. At the core of the extension is a secure multi-
party computation protocol that leverages additively homomorphic encryption and
blinding.
Statement of Contribution This paper was co-authored with Ioannis Agadakos, Dim-
itrios Damopoulos, Georgios Portokalidis and Andrei Sabelfeld. I contributed with
the privacy-preserving architecture and implementation. All authors contributed
equally to the writing of the material.
This paper was published in the proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference on
Computer Security Applications (ACSAC 2016).
3.5 Privacy-Preserving Location-Proximity for Mobile Apps
While, as seen above, there has been much recent progress by the research com-
munity on developing privacy-enhancing mechanisms for LBS, their evaluation has
often focused on the privacy guarantees, while the question of whether these mech-
anisms can be adopted by practical LBS applications has received limited attention.
This paper studies the applicability of privacy-preserving location proximity pro-
tocols in the setting of mobile apps. We categorize popular social location-based
apps and analyze the trade-os of privacy and functionality with respect to privacy-
enhancing enhancements. To investigate the practical performance trade-os, we
present an in-depth case study of an Android application that implements InnerCir-
cle, a state-of-the-art protocol for privacy-preserving location proximity. This study
indicates that the performance of the privacy-preserving application for coarse-
grained precision is comparable to real applications with the same feature set.
Statement of Contribution This paper was co-authored with Simonas Stirbys, Omar
Abu Nabah and Andrei Sabelfeld. Omar, Simonas and I contributed to the technical
development during the project. All authors contributed equally to the writing of
the material.
This paper was published in the proceedings of the 25th Euromicro International
Conference on Parallel, Distributed and Network-based Processing (PDP 2017).
3.6 Privacy-Preserving Ridesharing
Location-based services have revolutionized transportation business, as witnessed
by the success of Uber, Lyft, BlaBlaCar, and the like. From a privacy point of view,
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these services leave much to be desired. The location of the user is shared with the
service, opening up for privacy abuse, as in some recently publicized cases [3].
To mitigate such privacy concerns in ridesharing applications, the last paper of
the thesis presents PrivatePool, a model for privacy-preserving ridesharing. While
primitives like proximity-testing are rather easy to dene, ridesharing is a “large”
concept. We focus on scenarios more aligned with car-pooling approach taken by
BlaBlaCar, rather than the taxi-like structure like that of Uber. We formalize the case
when two users specify an origin and a destination of a trip, and they want to nd out
whether they can share a ride in a privacy-preserving manner. Our resulting model is
rather complex, and creating even a privacy-insensitive system to match rides in this
manner proves rather impractical. Instead, we focus on two corner cases. The rst is
when both the origins and the destinations for the two users are close, which we call
endpoint-matching. The second is when a large portion of the routes overlap, which
we call intersection-based matching. Intersection-based matching can be useful in
many cases even if the endpoints are very far apart. The two situations are depicted
in Figure 4, where the left image shows end-point matching and on the right-hand
side we can see intersection-based matching.
Fig. 4. End-point matching and route intersection
The paper presents secure multi-party computation techniques for endpoint and
intersection-based matching that allow the protocols to be run without trusting third
parties. At the same time, the users learn of a ride segment they can share and noth-
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ing else about other users’ location. For endpoint matching, we build on InnerCircle
to create an SMC protocol to detect if both of the endpoints are suciently close.
For intersection-based matching, we created a novel cryptographic technique, called
threshold key encapsulation (T-KEM). We plug T-KEM into existing solutions for pri-
vately computing the intersection of two sets, one held by each user. This ts nicely
in our case, if the two sets are dened by the points traversed during their trips.
Statement of Contribution This paper was co-authored with Claudio Orlandi and
Andrei Sabelfeld. All authors contributed equally to the technical development and
writing of the material.
This paper will be published in the proceedings of the 30th IEEE Computer Se-
curity Foundations Symposium (CSF 2017).
4 Future work
There are still much to do in the interest of achieving better location privacy. While
many of the cryptographic techniques used in this thesis can be called practical out-
of-context, a fully-edged system built on top of SMC needs more work before it is
useful in practice.
On the one hand, practically-oriented research results are needed to show how
to use SMC in general without information leakage from a running system. As SMC
works on the application layer, it is oblivious to information on other levels such
as IP addresses etc. Each user currently needs to trust the environment which is
running the application both on their machine and on the machine which they are
communicating with, and they need to trust the service that is distributing the binary
for the application they are running.
On the other hand, further foundational work is needed in terms of scalability
to large numbers of users. The state of the art is making great leaps in this direction,
such that is now possible to eciently compute a xed function of many users [15].
However, state-of-the art SMC protocols are only ecient for a limited number of
users for cases like ours where each party wants to evaluate a dierent function, as
the question “who can I share a ride with?” is context-sensitive.
On another note, I also feel there is a need for more work from the software-
engineering community. It is very dierent to debug an application with and without
access to the values stored in each variable. We need to adapt processes and tools,
to discuss things such as logging, backup, and many other issues which are more-
or-less solved in the traditional setting also in the encrypted domain.
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5 Conclusions
The thesis presents usages of SMC within location-based services and an augmen-
tation of additively homomorphic encryption to add a privacy-guaranteed multipli-
cation functionality. All of these serve to some extent in giving the far end of the
information exchange more control over data disclosure, moving away from cen-
tralized architectures relying on trust and achieving a higher level of privacy. Trust
in third parties is through these techniques reduced, and the owner of data can be
more condent that it is handled and used as they intend.
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